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Josh Pickar
Covert Consensus: Why the United States Supreme Court Won’t Admit That It Uses
Consensus to Interpret the Constitution
Joshua Pickar 1
The European Court of Human Right’s doctrine of emerging consensus is widely lauded as
a mechanism for the ECHR to maintain legitimacy absent an enforcement mechanism by deferring to
states’ various interpretations of the European Convention on Human Rights. By contrast, the United
States Supreme Court has no such explicit doctrine of deference to state implementation of
constitutional provisions. And, were the Court to announce one prospectively, there would likely be
vociferous resistance as the constitutional traditions of the US run contrary to the idea that the federal
Constitution would change based on states’ decision to enact or repeal laws. Yet, it appears that—at
least in some instances—the Supreme Court does implicitly employ a form of emerging consensus in
its jurisprudence, akin to that of the European Court. This paper explores why the Supreme Court
is covert in its application of the emerging consensus approach while the ECHR explicitly employs the
doctrine, focusing on the key differences between the European and American systems to explain these
divergent approaches.
The European Court of Human Rights (“ECHR”) famously employs the doctrine of
emerging consensus to evaluate member states’ compliance with the European Convention on
Human Rights (the “Convention”). 2 This analysis requires the ECHR to look at both the pure
number of member states with a given law and also the speed at which laws are changing among the
Council of Europe member states. This approach is applauded as a means for an international court
interpreting a multilateral convention to retain legitimacy in the absence of an enforcement
mechanism. 3
By contrast, the US Supreme Court has no such doctrine, and would be loath to ever
explicitly announce a principle whereby its interpretation of the federal Constitution relied on states’

J.D. Candidate 2017, The University of Chicago Law School.
Beginning in the 1950s, the ECHR began to employ the Margin of Appreciation (the “Margin”) in the
context of Article 15. The first such case involved an application by Greece against the United Kingdom for
failure to conform to the convention in Cyprus. For the next two decades, a number of other cases invoked
the Margin as well; however, it was not until the 1972 Hadyside case that the Court fully expounded upon the
Doctrine. Accordingly, the Court looks to four factors in determining the breadth of the Margin, namely: (1)
whether there exists a European consensus, (2) whether there is a moral issue at stake, (3) the nature of the
right, and (4) whether the there is a conflict of Convention values. Most important, however, is European
Consensus, and this factor forms the basis of the US-Europe comparison.
3 See, e.g., Oskar Holmer, Decoding the Margin of Appreciation doctrine in its use by the European Court of Human Rights,
https://perma.cc/AQ8Y-GP7X.
1
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decisions to enact or repeal a law. Yet in a number of the Court’s most famous and influential
opinions—often those involving rights not explicitly listed in the Constitution, 4 but of great public
importance—the Court implicitly employs an emerging consensus approach. These cases include
Bowers v. Hardwick, 5 Lawrence v. Texas, 6 Pace v. Alabama, 7 Loving v. Virginia, 8 Plessy v. Ferguson, 9 Brown v.
Board of Education, 10 Stanford v. Kentucky, 11 Roper v. Simmons, 12 Heller v. District of Columbia, 13 Griswold v.
Connecticut, 14 Roe v. Wade, 15 and Obergefell v. Hodges. 16
As a brief example, let us consider the 2005 case Roper v. Simmons. 17 In Roper, the Court
overruled its prior decision from 1989 in Stanford v. Kentucky, 18 holding that the imposition of capital
punishment on minors was unconstitutional. At the time of Stanford, twenty-two states allowed the
death penalty for sixteen-year-olds and twenty-five for seventeen-year-olds. 19 However, by the time

These have included including the rights to: privacy, marry, contraception, abortion and, (arguably) bear
arms as an individual.
5 478 US 186 (1986) (finding state bans on criminal sodomy laws constitutional).
6 539 US 558 (2003) (finding state bans on criminal sodomy laws unconstitutional).
7 106 US 583 (1883) (finding states bans on miscegenation constitutional).
8 388 US 1 (1967) (finding states bans on miscegenation unconstitutional).
9 163 US 537 (1896) (finding “separate but equal” to be constitutional).
10 347 US 483 (1954) finding “separate but equal” to be unconstitutional).
11 492 US 361 (1989) (finding death penalty for minors constitutional).
12 543 US 551 (2005) (finding death penalty for minors unconstitutional).
13 553 US 570 (2008) (finding an individual right to bear arms in the Constitution).
14 381 US 479 (1965) (finding state prohibition on contraceptives unconstitutional as violating the right to
privacy).
15 410 US 113 (1973) (finding right to abortion in the Constitution under the right to privacy).
16 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015) (finding state bans on same-sex marriage unconstitutional).
17 543 US 551 (2005).
18 492 US 361 (1989).
19 As the Court acknowledged, “In determining whether a punishment violates evolving standards of decency,
this Court looks . . . to the conceptions of modern American society as reflected by objective evidence. The
primary and most reliable evidence of national consensus-the pattern of federal and state laws-fails to meet
petitioners’ heavy burden of proving a settled consensus.” 492 US at 362. The Court explicitly found that
“[o]f the 37 States that permit capital punishment, 15 decline to impose it on 16-year-olds and 12 on 17-yearolds. This does not establish the degree of national agreement this Court has previously thought sufficient to
label a punishment cruel and unusual.” Id.
4
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of Roper, only eighteen states allowed for the death penalty of sixteen-year-olds. 20 This change in the
number of states might have implicitly helped the Supreme Court to overrule Stanford.
Data on state laws and petitions for certiorari denied by US Supreme Court suggest that the
Court implicitly considers state consensus on contentious issues before “constitutionalizing” them.
This approach is similar to that of the ECHR, despite the fact that the Court and the ECHR have
different legislative mandates and interpret substantially different documents. The following argues
that Supreme Court’s covert use of an emerging consensus approach is likely based on two factors
that distinguish it from the ECHR, including: (1) different legitimacy concerns, and (2) different
theories of interpretation.
Part I of this essay outlines a number of cases in which the Supreme Court imposed a new
constitutional mandate on the states using emerging consensus. Part II analyzes this data and
questions why emerging consensus is not an explicit constitutional doctrine in the US. Finally, Part
III offers some conclusions and insights for what this means more broadly for courts in federal
systems, considering whether new courts should employ the doctrine of consensus overtly or
covertly.
I.

AMERICAN CONSENSUS
In many areas of the law, consensus is explicitly the means of change. Indeed, federal laws

are passed with the majority of both the House and the Senate, 21 and amendments to the

Twenty-three states remained allowing the death penalty for seventeen-year-olds. See DEATH PENALTY
INFORMATION CENTER, State-By-State, (last accessed May 2, 2017), https://perma.cc/Z62D-6MBG. This is
consistent with a change in public opinion. Compare GALLUP, Death Penalty (May 2002),
https://perma.cc/34P9-Y29K (finding that sixty-one percent of Americans supported the death penalty for
juvenile murderers), with ROPER CENTER, Death Penalty 45 (Oct./Nov. 1999), https://perma.cc/KW2D8SEG (finding that sixty-one percent of Americans supported the death penalty for juvenile murderers).
21 US CONST. art. 1, § 1 (“All Legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United
States, which shall consist of a Senate a House of Representatives.”).
20
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Constitution are passed in a similar fashion. 22 But it is not particularly surprising that the legislative
process relies on consensus: the purpose of creating a bicameral Congress was to ensure that there
would be both proportional representation of populations in the House, and that each state would
also have an equal voice to each of the other states in the Senate. 23
Beyond the pure legislative process, the Restatements of Law and Federal Rules provide
other examples of consensus in the law-making process. For example, the 2007 amendment to the
Rule 56 in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure explicitly took into account the reality of how
district courts decide motions for summary judgment. 24 Similarly, in other Restatements of Law, the
American Law Institute frequently looks to state law practice to determine the rules which, in turn,
affects the development of the common law. 25
But the Supreme Court’s use of consensus is different. The Supreme Court appears to
employ the consensus approach primarily in cases where: (1) there is no explicit constitutional
provision supporting the decision, and (2) the issue is one of great public importance. 26 The

US CONST. art. 5 (“This Congress, whenever two thirds of both Houses shall deem it necessary, shall
propose amendments to this Constitution . . . . which . . . shall be valid to all Intents and Purposes, as Part of
this Constitution when ratified by the Legislatures of three fourths of the several States.”).
23 For this reason, there are few suits brought against the federal government alleging that federal legislation
harmfully targets minorities. This is because the federal judiciary is, in theory, the body of the federal
government with roughly the same worldview as the decision makers in the political branches—and it is built
to be that way. See generally Richard A. Primus, Bolling Alone, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 975, 975 (2004) (arguing that
the lack of successful race discrimination claims against the federal government “is not a function of a lack of
federal discrimination,” but rather “is a function of the shared norms between the federal judiciary and the
political branches of the federal government”). This means that, for the most part, the minority groups that
the courts believe to be worthy of protection are the ones that the political branches largely have not passed
legislation to affect. Id. at 1021–22. However, sometimes there may be a time lag between the protection of
the political branches and of the courts, and it is in those moments where the courts expand constitutional
protections. Id.
24 Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 committee notes on rules (2007) (“‘Should’ in amended Rule 56(c) recognizes that courts
will seldom exercise the discretion to deny summary judgment when there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact.”).
25 See generally David B. Massey, How the American Law Institute Influences Customary Law; The Reasonableness
Requirement of the Restatement of Foreign Relations Law, 22 YALE J. INT’L L. 419 (1997).
26 It is difficult to define exactly what it means for an issue to be of great public importance. These cases are
typically the “blockbuster” cases of a given year, and a couple of examples include cases concerning abortion,
gay marriage, and the death penalty.
22
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following explores a number of cases where the Supreme Court employed the consensus approach
in answering constitutional questions.
A.

Consensus in the Courts

In order to understand how the Supreme Court uses consensus, it is instructive to examine a
number of key cases. These cases demonstrate how the Supreme Court employs the consensus
approach explicitly in some contexts, while doing so implicitly in others. This section draws upon
state laws, public opinion data, and failed petitions for certiorari to demonstrate the Supreme
Court’s use of consensus in rendering constitutional decisions.
Some areas of constitutional interpretation explicitly require an inquiry into the practice of
states. 27 The Supreme Court occasionally treats state legislation as a source of “knowledge relevant
to the solution of trying questions.” 28 For example, in applying the Eighth Amendment, which states
that, “Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual
punishments inflicted,” 29 the Court explicitly looks to state practice. Justice Warren announced that
“[t]he [Eighth] Amendment must draw its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that
mark the progress of a maturing society,” 30 which requires an eye toward state practice. However, in
other areas of the law, including the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court more casually and covertly

For a survey of this practice, see generally State Law as “Other Law”: Our Fifty Sovereigns in the Federal
Constitutional Cannon, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1670, 1672 (2007) (explaining how the Court looks to state laws
under the Fourteenth Amendment fundamental rights cases, Fourth Amendment search-and-seizure cases,
Sixth Amendment jury cases, and Eighth Amendment capital punishment cases).
28 Ruth B. Ginsburg, A Decent Respect to the Opinions of [Human]kind” The Value of a Comparative Perspective in
Constitutional Adjudication, 1 FIU L. REV. 27, 32 (2006).
29 US CONST. amend. VIII.
30 Trop v. Dulles, 356 US 86 (1958). However, many scholars have criticized the idea of “evolving standards of
decency.” See, e.g., John F. Stinneford, The Original Meaning of ‘Unusual’: The Eighth Amendment as a Bar to Cruel
Innovation, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 1739, 1746-47 (2009) (“[T]he word ‘unusual’ was a term of art that referred to
government practices that deviate from ‘long usage’ . . . . Without a renewed recognition of the significance of
the word ‘unusual,’ courts will be powerless when faced with the primary danger against which the Cruel and
Unusual Punishments Clause was designed to protect: The tyranny of enflamed majority opinion.”).
27

5

Josh Pickar
LSW Paper
employs a consensus approach, often without any explanation for why. 31 Advocacy groups, such as
the ACLU and Lambda, are aware of the fact that the Court employs consensus, and are careful
about when to bring impact litigation claims. 32
i.

Bowers v. Hardwick and Lawrence v. Texas

One of the most striking instances of the Supreme Court’s use of consensus is in the context
of criminal restrictions on sodomy. In 1986 in Bowers v. Hardwick, 33 the Court held 5–4 that a
Georgia law was constitutional. Less than twenty years later in Lawrence v. Texas, 34 the Court
overruled Bowers 6–3, holding that anti-sodomy laws are unconstitutional under the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 35 What changed during the twenty years between Bowers and
Lawrence? Twelve less states had anti-sodomy laws.
Before the Supreme Court’s decision in Bowers, every state criminalized sodomy, categorizing
the act as felonious. 36 These prohibitions dated back at least as far as 1779, at which time Thomas
Jefferson proposed a bill which would punish by castration men who engage in sodomy. 37 As the

For example, in a very recent case before the Court, Esquivel-Quintana v. Sessions, No. 16-54, Petitioner was
ordered deported for sexual abuse of a minor under California law for sex with his girlfriend who was three
years younger than him. However, had Mr. Esquivel-Quintana been living in forty-three other states, or the
District of Columbia, his acts would not have been an “aggravated felony” as based on state law and,
therefore, he could not be deported for his actions. The issue of consensus became important at oral
argument, where the attorney for Esquivel-Quintana stated: “[A]ll you are dealing with this in this case is a
few – there’s actually seven outlier statutes that go further than Federal law, and that have backup provisions
that are going to still allow the Federal government to seek automatic removal or some other immigration
remedy.” Transcript of Oral Argument at pages 23–24, Esquivel-Quintana v. Sessions, (2017) (No. 16-54),
https://perma.cc/2ZK8-JK9H.
32 See, e.g., Erin Ryan, The Public Trust Doctrine, Private Water Allocation, and Mono Lake: The Historic Saga of
National Audubon Society v. Superior Court, 45 ENVTL. L. 561, 630 (2015) (“Usually, the plaintiffs in
strategic impact litigation make carefully tailored decisions about when and where to file, professionally
counseled to aim for legal moments at which the chosen jurisdiction appears ready for the new interpretation
the litigants are promoting.”).
33 478 US 186 (1986).
34 539 US 558 (2003).
35 US CONST. amend. XIV (“No State shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due
process of law.”).
36 478 US at 192–93 (“In fact, until 1961, all 50 states outlawed sodomy.”).
37 Thomas Jefferson, A Bill for Proportioning Crimes and Punishments, 1778 Papers 2: 492–504 (“Whosoever shall
be guilty of Rape, Polygamy, or Sodomy with a man or woman shall be punished, if a man, by castration, if a
31
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Court explained in Bowers, “Proscriptions again [sodomy] have ancient roots.” 38 In 1962, the
American Law Institute developed the Model Penal Code (“MPC”) promote uniformity among state
criminal laws. The MPC decriminalized consensual sodomy, opting instead to make it a crime to
solicit for sodomy. 39 In 1962, Illinois adopted the recommendation of the American Law Institute,
becoming the first state to remove criminal penalties for sodomy. 40 By 1986, the year the Court
decided Bowers, twenty-six states had removed their criminal sodomy laws—the majority through
legislative repeal—while a few state court decisions invalidated laws on the basis of either the federal
or state Constitution. 41
In Bowers, 42 a “practicing homosexual” 43 was convicted of consensual sodomy under a
Georgia statute. 44 Petitioner challenged the law as a violation of the right to privacy under the Due
Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. 45 The Court framed the question
woman, by cutting thro’ the cartilage of her nose a hole of one half inch dimeter at the least.”),
https://perma.cc/7EP6-JXFE. This was actually a decriminalization of sodomy, as the prior punishment was
death. See JEAN HALLEY & AMY ESHELMAN, SEEING STRAIGHT: AN INTRODUCTION TO GENDER AND
SEXUAL PRIVILEGE 16 (2017).
38 478 US at 192 (citing Yao, Survey on the Constitutional Right to Privacy in the Context of Homosexual Activity, 40 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 521, 525 (1986)). As Yao explains, “The earliest legal argument for outlawing homosexuality
can be found in Plato’s Laws.” 40 U. MIAMI L. REV. at 525.
39 Model Penal Code § 213.2 (Proposed Official Draft 1962). Blackstone “later restated . . . sodomy legislation
as prohibiting an ‘infamous crime against nature.’ Blackstone’s characterization of sodomy, as a ‘crime against
nature,’ would serve as the basis for most American sodomy laws.” Id. (citing William Blackstone, 4
Commentaries *215).
40 Criminal Code of 1961, §§ 11–2, 11–3, 1961 Ill. Laws, pp. 1985, 2006 (codified as amended at Ill. Rev. Stat.,
ch. 38 ¶¶ 11–2, 11–3 (1983) (repealed 1984)).
41 The twenty-six state that repealed their laws were: Alaska (1980), California (1976), Colorado (1972),
Connecticut (1971), Delaware (1973), Hawaii (1973), Illinois (1971), Indiana (1976), Iowa (1977), Maine
(1976), Massachusetts (1974, Comm v. Balthazar), Nebraska (1977), New Hampshire (1975), New Jersey
(1977), New Mexico (1975), New York (1980, NY v. Onofre),North Dakota (1973), Ohio (1974), Oregon
(1972), Pennsylvania (1980, Comm. v. Bandio), South Dakota (1977), Vermont (1977), Washington (1976),
West Virginia (1976), Wisconsin (1983), Wyoming (1977),
42 478 US 186 (1986)
43 Id. at 188.
44 Ga. Code Ann. § 16–6–2(a)–(b) (1984) provided, in pertinent part: “A person commits the offense of
sodomy when he performs or submits to any sexual act involving the sex organs of one person and the
mouth of another . . . . the offense of sodomy shall be punished by imprisonment for not less than one nor
more than 20 years.”
45 See US CONST. amend. V (“No person shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process
of law”); US CONST. amend. XIV (same).
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presented as “whether the Federal Constitution confers a fundamental right upon homosexuals to
engage in sodomy and hence invalidates the laws of the many States that still make such conduct
illegal and have done so for a very long time.” 46
The Court in Bowers went out of its way to explain how widespread the criminalization of
sodomy was, and how long back the practice dated. Noting that “[s]odomy was a criminal office at
common law and was forbidden by the laws of the original thirteen States when they ratified the Bill
of Rights,” 47 the Court continued by outlining that “[i]n 1868 . . . all but 5 of the 37 states in the
Union had criminal sodomy laws. In fact, until 1961, all 50 states outlawed sodomy, and today, 24
States and the District of Columbia continue to provide criminal penalties for sodomy performed in
private and between consenting adults.” 48 Based on the fact that there existed widespread approval
and enforcement of anti-sodomy laws, Justice White, writing for the majority, explained that were
the Court to diverge from the state consensus, the Court would lose legitimacy: “The Court is most
vulnerable and comes nearest to illegitimacy when it deals with judge-made constitutional law having
little or no cognizable roots in the language or design of the Constitution.” 49 Accordingly, the Court
held that the Constitution “does not confer a fundamental right upon homosexuals to engage in
sodomy.” 50
An eye toward failed petitions for certiorari helps to demonstrate the Supreme Court’s
approach to consensus as well. In 1998 in Thompson v. United States, 51 an active duty member of the
military was convicted of consensual sodomy with his wife under the Uniform Code of Military

478 US at 190.
Id. at 192.
48 Id. at 192–94.
49 Id. at 194.
50 Id. at 186.
51 No. ACM 31803, 1996 WL 493013 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. Aug. 8, 1996).
46
47
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Justice (UCMJ). 52 He petitioned the Supreme Court for certiorari, 53 arguing that Article 128 of the
UCMJ was unconstitutional as a violation of the right to privacy. 54 At the time of this petition, four
fewer states had anti-sodomy statutes on the books. However, the Court denied certiorari. 55
In 2003, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Lawrence v. Texas. 56 Like Bowers, Lawrence
concerned a state prosecution for sodomy in Texas. 57 The Court’s pointed to two reasons
supporting its decision to overrule: (1) “the fact that a State’s governing majority has traditionally
viewed a particular practice as immoral is not a sufficient reason for upholding a law prohibiting the
practice,” and (2) “individual decisions concerning the intimacies of physical relationships, even
when not intended to produce offspring, are a form of ‘liberty’ protected by due process.” 58
However, it also appears that the change in the number of states criminalizing and prosecuting
sodomy laws prompted the Supreme Court’s decision. The Court noted: “Bowers’ deficiencies
became even more apparent in the years following its announcement. The 26 States with laws
prohibiting the conduct referenced in Bowers are reduced now to 14, or which 4 enforce their laws
only against homosexual conduct.” 59

Art. 128, U.C.M.J., 10 USC. § 925(a) (“Any person subject to this chapter who engaged in unnatural carnal
copulation with another person of the same or opposite sex by unlawful force or without the consent of the
other person is guilty of forcible sodomy and shall be punished as a court-martial may direct.”).
53 No. 97-1504, 1997 WL 34103380 (1998),
54 See generally Griswold v. Connecticut, 318 US 479 (1965).
55 523 US 1077 (1998).
56 539 US 558 (2003).
57 Lawrence was prosecuted under Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 21.06(a)(2003), which provides: “A person
commits an offense if he engages in deviate sexual intercourse with another individual of the same sex.” The
statute defines “[d]eviate sexual intercourse” as: “(A) any contact between any part of the genitals of one
person and the mouth or anus of another person; or (B) the penetration of the genitals or the anus of another
person with an object.” § 21.01(1).
58 539 US at 560.
59 539 US at 559. Justice O’Connor concurred, arguing that Lawrence was distinguishable from Bowers insofar
as the law at issue in Bowers was generally applicable against both heterosexual and homosexual couples, while
the law in Lawrence only proscribed same-sex contact. See 539 US at 581, 585 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“The
Texas statute makes homosexuals unequal in the eyes of the law by making particular conduct—and only that
conduct—subject to criminal sanction . . . . I therefore concur in the Court’s judgment that Texas’ sodomy
law banning ‘deviate sexual intercourse’ between consenting adults of the same sex, but not between
consenting adults of different sexes, is unconstitutional.”).
52
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A mere seventeen years after Bowers, the Court overruled in Lawrence. The text of the
Constitution had not changed, nor had a new document indicating that the founders approved of
sodomy emerged from the annals of history. The major change was the proportion of states
criminalizing sodomy versus those who had repealed their anti-sodomy laws. During this period,
public opinion changed as well. In 1977, forty-three percent of Americans thought that
“homosexual relations between adults” should be legal, forty three percent thought that they should
be illegal, and fourteen percent had no opinion. 60 During the 1980s, nearly sixty percent of
Americans thought that homosexual relations between consenting adults should be illegal, while
approximately thirty percent thought they should be legal. 61 By May 2003 nearly sixty percent
thought the practice should be legal while only thirty-five percent opposed. 62 As demonstrated by
the trajectory from Bowers to Lawrence, considering state laws and public opinion, the Supreme Court
appears to consider consensus in interpreting ambiguous provisions of the Constitution when the
case is of great public importance.
ii.

Pace v. Alabama and Loving v. Virginia

As was the case in the progression from Bowers to Lawrence, the Supreme Court reversed
trajectory in cases concerning anti-miscegenation laws as states began to repeal their laws. First, in
Pace v. Alabama, 63 the Court upheld Alabama’s anti-miscegenation statute when thirty-two states had
similar prohibitions. Then, in Loving v. Virginia, 64 the Court found a Virginia anti-miscegenation
statute unconstitutional, overruling only sixteen states.

60 Frank Newport, Six in 10 Americans Agree that Gay Sex Should Be Legal, GALLUP, June 27, 2003,
https://perma.cc/A53R-63UU.
61 Id.
62 Id.
63 106 US 583 (1883).
64 388 US 1 (1967).
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In Pace, the Court found that Alabama’s prohibition on interracial marriage did not violate
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. First, the Court pointed to the fact that
the Equal Protection Clause was meant “to prevent hostile and discriminating state legislation
against any person or class or persons.” 65 The Supreme Court concluded that, because the Alabama
law “applie[d] the same punishment to both offenders, the white and the black,” there was no
violation of the Equal protection clause. 66 At the time the Court decided Pace, thirty-two states had
anti-miscegenation laws.
Then, nearly eighty years later, the Court overruled Pace and found a Virginia antimiscegenation statute unconstitutional in Loving v. Virginia. 67 The Court explicitly noted that
“Virginia is now one of 16 States which prohibit and punish marriages on the basis of racial
classifications,” 68 and rebuffed “the notion that the mere ‘equal application’ of a statute containing
racial classifications is enough to remove the classifications from the Fourteenth Amendment’s
proscription of all invidious discrimination” 69 from Pace. Additionally, as was the case with BowersLawrence, public opinion changed on the question of whether society “approve[d] or disapproved of
marriage between blacks and whites,” though not nearly as starkly. 70 In 1959, four percent approved,
while by 1968 twenty percent approved. 71 But even twenty percent is nowhere near the sixty percent
margin of approval at the time of Lawrence. As was the case in the Bowers-Lawrence trajectory, from

106 US at 584
Id.
67 388 US 1 (1967).
68 Id. at 6. The Virginia statute made it illegal for “any white person [to] intermarry with a colored person, or
any colored [to] intermarry with a white person,” punishing violators of a felony with no less than a five-year
sentence. Va. Code 20–58.
69 388 US at 8.
70 Frank Newport, In US, 87% Approve of Black-White Marriage, vs. 4% in 1958, GALLUP, July 25, 2013,
https://perma.cc/33EU-ZKW7.
71 Id.
65
66
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the time of Pace to Loving the number of states with anti-miscegenation severely decreased and only
when a minority remained did the Court impose a new constitutional rule.
iii.

District of Columbia v. Heller

It is of note the Court’s consensus approach does not apply only in the civil rights context.
Indeed, in the context of the Second Amendment, 72 the Court found that there was an individual
right to bear arms once a majority of states provided such a right in 2008 in District of Columbia v.
Heller. 73 Before Heller, there were a number of cases that petitioned the Court for certiorari dating
back to as early as 1996, 74 the last of which was filed in 2005. And in Heller, the Court itself
acknowledged that the strict District of Columbia law was an outlier: “Few laws in the history of our
Nation have come close to the severe restriction of the District’s handgun ban.” 75
Commentators have heralded Heller on a number of grounds. Some consider Heller to be the
most originalist opinion ever drafted. 76 Other scholars opine that the relevant historical texts do not
support the conclusion that the Second Amendment supports an individual right to bear arms;
instead, they view the Heller decision as “overrid[ing] democratic judgments in favor of a dubious
understanding of the Constitution.” 77 Still, there is a third group of scholars, who neither view Heller
as the paragon of originalism nor as an anti-democratic abomination: instead, they view Heller as

US CONST. amend. II (“A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of
the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.”).
73 554 US 570 (2008).
74 Bach v. Pataski, No. 05-786, 2005 WL 3486081 (Dec. 19, 2005); Seegars v. Gonzales, No. 05-365, 2005 WL
2295182 (Sept. 16, 2005); Costerus v. Swift, No. 02-427, 2002 WL 32134491 (June 27, 2002); Silveira v. Lockyer,
No, 03-51, 2002 WL 32166832 (Oct. 2002); Hickman v. City of Los Angeles, No. 96-109, 1996 WL 33422748
(July 5, 1996).
75 554 US at 629.
76 See, e.g., Randy E. Barnett, New Flash, the Constitution Means What It Says, WALL ST. J., June 27, 2008,
https://perma.cc/S8KC-R2WB (“Justice Scalia’s opinion is the finest example of what is not called ‘original
public meaning’ jurisprudence ever adopted by the Supreme Court.”).
77 See Cass R. Sunstein, Second Amendment Minimalism: Heller as Griswold, 122 Harv. L. Rev. 246 (2008) (citing
SAUL CORNELL, A WELL-REGULATED MILITIA: THE FOUNDING FATHERS AND THE ORIGINS OF GUN
CONTROL IN AMERICA (2006); Jack N. Rakove, The Second Amendment: The Highest Stage of Originalism, 76 CHI.KENT L. REV. 103, 158 (2000)).
72
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building upon the methodology of consensus as, despite the fact that “[t]he Court worked hard to
support its decision by reference to the standard legal materials . . . [,] the national consensus
probably provides the best explanation of what the Court did.” 78 The third approach, that of
consensus, is exactly the same as that which the Court uses in the civil rights context.
It is somewhat difficult to quantify state laws in this realm, as the laws can be so varied and
precise that it would be inappropriate to haphazardly group them. Suffice it to say that a majority of
states had laws that provided—at a minimum—an individual right to bear arms. Public opinion polls
are quite clear, though: in 1990, seventy-eight percent of people thought that there should be more
strict gun laws while in 2008 only forty-nine percent thought so. 79 Heller demonstrates that the
Court’s consensus approach is not only for progressive civil rights issues, but can inform a variety of
constitutional provisions, and a change in consensus can lead to a direct change in the interpretation
of the laws.
iv.

Roe v. Wade

One case in which the Supreme Court deviated from its own pattern, imposing a
constitutional ruling onto a majority of states, was Roe v. Wade. 80 In Roe, the Supreme Court
considered the constitutionality of a Texas statute criminalizing abortion. 81 The Court found the
restriction unconstitutional as a violation of the right to privacy enshrined “in the Fourteenth
Amendment’s concept of personal liberty and restrictions upon state action.” 82 Most notable about
Roe, however, is not that the Court imposed a new constitutional rule; instead, the Court imposed a

Sunstein, supra note 77 at 247.
GALLUP, Guns, https://perma.cc/K3DK-QWS7.
80 410 US 113 (1973).
81 Tex. Penal Code § 1191 reads: “If any person shall designedly administer to a pregnant woman or
knowingly procure to be administered with her consent any drug or medicine . . . and thereby procure an
abortion, he shall be confined in the penitentiary not less than two nor more than five years.”
82 410 US at 153.
78
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new constitutional rule on a majority of states. Perhaps for this reason, Roe remains highly
contentious and, as viewed by many, an illegitimate decision of the Court. 83
The Supreme Court acknowledged that “[i]n the past several years . . . a trend toward
liberalization of abortion statutes has resulted in adoption, by one-third of the States of less stringent
laws.” 84 Prior to Roe, twenty-nine states made abortion completely illegal. 85 Other states had different
permutations of abortion regulations. For example, Mississippi made abortions illegal except in cases
of rape, and the remaining twenty states either permitted abortion on request, when the pregnancy
posed a danger to the woman’s health, or when the fetus was likely to be damaged. 86 Twenty-nine is
far more states that the Court overruled in Roe than in any other case discussed in this article. And
twenty-nine only include those states that prohibited all forms of abortion no matter the
circumstance; one could easily include those states with rules like Mississippi as being in the
majority.
It should be noted that, despite the lack of state law consensus regarding the right to
abortion, there was public opinion supporting the Court’s decision. In 1975, nearly sixty percent of
Americans thought that abortion should be legal “only under certain circumstances” and another
twenty percent thought it should be “legal under any circumstances.” 87 The figures have not changed
too much into modern day; now fifty percent think abortion should be legal “only under certain
circumstances,” while about thirty percent think abortion should be legal “under any

See LACKLAND H. BLOOM, JR., DO GREAT CASES MAKE BAD LAW? 320 (2014) (“To some extent the very
fact that the Court did revisit Roe in Casey is a testament to the fact that the critics of Roe both on and off the
Court attacked the decision as not simply wrongly decided, but rather as a wholly illegitimate exercise of
judicial power.”).
84 310 US at 140.
85 See NAT’L RIGHT TO LIFE, Abortion History Timeline, (last accessed May 2, 2017), https://perma.cc/3EZSKMWC.
86 See Id.
87 GALLUP, Abortion, https://perma.cc/GXS2-3JTW. Perhaps this reflects the ultimate progress of the
Supreme Court’s abortion jurisprudence, culminating with the doctrine of “undue burden.” See Generally
Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 US 883 (1992).
83
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circumstances.” 88 The remaining twenty percent who think abortion should be “illegal in all
circumstances” has remained relatively static. 89
Perhaps in part because the Court in Roe overruled a majority of states, the decision is still
viewed as highly illegitimate by a number of critics and by the Republican party as a whole. Legal
academics on both the left and right hotly debate Roe’s legitimacy and the constitutionality of
abortion restrictions to this day. 90 But these debates are not merely academic. Indeed, both President
Trump and Democratic nominee Hillary Clinton announced that would-be Supreme Court justices’
view on Roe would serve as a decisive factor in Supreme Court nominations. 91 Perhaps in the context
of Roe, the Court was guided more by public opinion than by state laws. Nonetheless, there existed
consensus that contributed to the Supreme Court’s decision.
v.

Other Cases

A number of other important decisions from the Supreme Court exemplify the consensus
approach. 92 And this list is by no means exclusive, either. For example, the Court’s recent decision in
Obergefell v. Hodges, 93 as well as its decision in Griswold v. Connecticut, 94 conform with the above

GALLUP, Abortion, https://perma.cc/GXS2-3JTW.
Id.
90 See supra note 83. See also MARY ZIEGLER, AFTER ROE THE LOST HISTORY OF THE ABORTION DEBATE 56
(2015) (“According to the conventional historical account, a conviction that Roe was undemocratic and
illegitimate defined the national antiabortion movement and motivated activists.”).
91 See Mark Berman, Trump promised judges who would overturn Roe v. Wade, WASH. POST (Mar. 21, 2017),
https://perma.cc/4GRL-P3GF; Michelle Ruiz, Hillary Clinton Awesomely Defended Abortion Rights at the Debate,
VOGUE (Oct. 19, 2016), https://perma.cc/9UT7-8P9T.
92 See, e.g., Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 US 702 (1997) (holding that there is no right to assisted suicide); Reed v.
Reed, 404 US 71 (1971) (holding that administrators of estates cannot be chosen in a way that discriminates on
the basis of sex); Romer v. Evans, 517 US 620 (1996) (holding that state constitutional amendment that
prevented a protected status based on sexual orientation did not violate the equal protection clause); Brown v.
Bd. of Educ., 437 US 483 (1954) (holding that “separate but equal” is unconstitutional); Plessy v. Ferguson, 163
US 537 (1896) (holding that “separate but equal” is constitutional).
93 576 US __, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015) (holding that there is a right for homosexual couples to marry and
overruling only fourteen states).
94 381 US 479 (1965). It is difficult to quantify exactly how many states had similar laws banning
contraception. As economist Martha J. Bailey explains, “Although 47 of the 48 coterminous states enacted
antiobscenity laws . . . idiosyncratic differences in language had an important impact on their relevance for
contraceptive access decades later. For instance, only 31 states explicitly enumerated ‘contraception’ among
88
89
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pattern. 95 In Griswold, one “conclusive” factor leading to the conclusion that the Connecticut statute
was unconstitutional was “the utter novelty of [the state’s] enactment. Although the federal
Government and many States have at one time or other had on the book statutes forbidding or
regulating the distribution of contraceptives, none . . .has made the use of contraceptives a crime.” 96
In sum, the Supreme Court’s use of consensus is pervasive, and appears not only in the
context of famous civil rights decisions, but in many areas of constitutional law. Yet, the Supreme
Court’s invocation of consensus is rarely overt despite its frequency. It therefore warrants further
analysis as to why the Court is generally silent about its invocation.
II.

THE SUPREME COURT’S COVERT CONSENSUS
The Supreme Court and the European Court of Human Rights each employ the doctrine of

consensus differently, as the two courts have different institutional duties and concerns. A better
understanding of the structure and goals of each of these two courts can better elucidate why the
Supreme Court is covert about applying consensus, while the ECHR is overt. Two specific factors
underlie this difference: (1) different legitimacy concerns and (2) different theories of interpretation.
But beyond the reasons for why the Supreme Court is covert in its application, one should
normatively consider the benefit of consensus in the American context. The following reviews these
factors in turn.
A.

Legitimacy

To be sure: both the Supreme Court and the ECHR have legitimacy concerns. But whereas
the ECHR system is premised on state consent to be bound by ECHR judgments, one does not

the regulated obscenities, and language in only 24 states additionally banned the ‘sales’ of contraceptive
supplies.” Martha J. Bailey, “Momma’s Got the Pill”: How Anthony Comstock and Griswold v. Connecticut Shaped
US Childbearing, 100 AM. ECON. REV. 98, 101 (2010)
95 RICHARD A. POSNER, SEX AND REASON 329 (1992); Bailey, supra note 94.
96 Poe v. Ullman, 367 US 497, 554 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting), incorporated by reference in Griswold v. Connecticut,
381 US 479, 500 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring in the judgment).
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conceptualize the US federal system as being based on states’ consent to be bound by the judgments
of the Supreme Court. The two courts are quite different, effectuating different policy goals and
serving different governmental functions. Accordingly, each court’s use of consensus—be it overt or
covert—is in large part based on the diverging legitimacy concerns of these two bodies.
The Supreme Court is primarily concerned that its decisions are grounded in solid
constitutional analysis with a basis in either the text or the traditions of the Constitution. Given that
the justices are unelected and serve for life “with no power except their institutional role and
persuasion to convince the country to abide by their decisions . . . [the Court’s] legitimacy rests not
just on the principle of the rule of law, but on the idea that there is some distance between
interpreting the law and making political decisions.” 97 The Court is aware of this, and acts to protect
its legitimacy consistent with these tenets. 98
The debate concerning the basis of the Supreme Court’s legitimacy is heated. 99 Some
scholars have found that the citizens have a sense of good will toward the Court, so that when a

Emma Long, The legitimacy of the US Supreme Court is at stake, THE CONVERSATION (Mar. 21, 2017),
https://perma.cc/9KPK-73UJ.
98 See generally Tom S. Clark, The Limits of Judicial Independence (2011).
99 The legitimacy concerns of the ECHR are pronounced as well. But unlike the US Supreme Court, the
ECHR is a supranational court imposing rules onto member states with widely diverging preferences. As a
means of maintaining legitimacy without acting as a supranational legislature to all Council of Europe
member states, the doctrine of emerging consensus provides a way for the ECHR to render judgments
consistent with the preferences of the various member states. See generally Yuval Shany, Toward a General Margin
of Appreciation Doctrine in International Law, 16 EUR. J. INT’L L. 907 (2005). However, when a judgement does
not comply with the preferences of a given state, a struggle can arise between the ECHR and the state. This
issue is coming to a head in Russia. Russia recently amended the law on the Constitutional Court of the
Russian Federation, which came into effect on December 14, 2015. The law gave the Constitutional Court
the power to declare judgement of the ECHR as “impossible to implement” on the grounds that the
interpretation of the Convention is inconsistent with the Russian Constitution. See Natalia Chaeva, The Russian
Constitutional Court and its Actual Control over the ECtHR Judgment in Achugov and Gladkov, EJIL: TALK!, Apr. 26,
2016, https://perma.cc/QDM5-979Z (citing https://perma.cc/2US7-K3RJ). In the Russian Constitutional
Court case of Achugov and Gladkov v. Russia, the Russian Constitutional Court held that the ECHR’s judgment
that Russia’s “blanket ban on convicted prisoners’ voting rights was incompatible with the” Convention
violated the Russian Constitution. Id. Article 32(3) of the Russian Constitution states, “Deprived of the right
to elect and be elected shall be citizens recognized by court as legally unfit as well as citizens kept in places of
confinement by a court sentence,” and refused to implement the ECHR’s judgment. St. 32(3) Konstitutsii
Rossiiskoi Federatsii ot 12 dekabrya 1993 goda // Rossiskaya Gazieta 25 dekabrya 1993. The Russian
97
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specific decision conflicts with an individual’s policy values, they do not view the decision as
illegitimate. 100 Others have found that the Court’s legitimacy is based on the American people’s
satisfaction with individual decisions. 101 And others have taken a more middle-of-the-road view,
concluding that “the Supreme Court need not make decisions pleasing to the majority all or even
most of the time. But because the Court currently attracts legitimacy form the majority, its ability to
rule against the people’s preferences, even up to one-half or so of the time, is secure.” 102 Given that
the US Supreme Court’s legitimacy concerns are based on writing opinions with strong analytical
reasoning—whereas the ECHR’s are based on having decisions fall within the mainstream—the
Supreme Court is less likely to explicitly rely on consensus.
B.

Methods of interpretation

The second reason for the Supreme Court’s covert invocation of consensus is that the
approach is at odds with textualism and originalism—two fundamental interpretive tools in
American constitutional law. 103 Both of these methods involve judicial restraint: judges see their
hands as being tied either by the text or the history of the Constitution. Textualism is a method
where judges look to the plain text of a statute or constitutional provision to determine its
meaning. 104 Originalism “regards the discoverable meaning of the Constitution at the time of its
Constitutional Court also considered this question in the recent case of Yukos v. Russian Federation, where it
refused to implement the judgement of the ECHR as being inconsistent with the Russian constitution. See also
Russia passes law to overrule European human rights court, BBC (Dec. 4, 2015), https://perma.cc/BD5P-6NN6.
However, in other contexts, countries have readily accepted that judgments of the ECHR trump their
national constitutions. See, e.g., A, B, C v. Ireland, App. No. 25579/05, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2010) (holding that
Ireland’s Constitution violated Article 8 of the European Convention concerning abortion).
100 James L. Gibson et al., Measuring Attitudes toward the United Sates Supreme Court, 47 AM. J. POL. SCI. 354
(2003).
101 Brandon L. Bartels & Christopher D. Johnston, On the Ideological Foundations of Supreme Court Legitimacy in the
American Public, 57 AM. J. POL. SCI. 184, 197 (2013) (“Contrary to conventional wisdom, a potent ideological
foundation underlies Supreme Court legitimacy vis-à-vis subjective ideological disagreement with the Court’s
policymaking.”).
102 James L. Gibson & Michael J. Nelson, Is the US Supreme Court’s Legitimacy Grounded in Performance Satisfaction
and Ideology?, 59 AM. J. POL. SCI. 162, 173 (2015).
103 See Robert Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1 (1971).
104 “Textualism,” 5 Encyclopedia of the Supreme Court of the United States 21–22 (Davis D. Tanenhaus ed., 2008).
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initial adoption as authoritative for purposes of constitutional interpretation in the present.” 105 Both
of these methods of interpretation are at odds with the consensus approach. And given that the
Constitution is explicit that states can regulate in certain areas, while the federal government can
regulate others, it seems odd that state laws should affect constitutional interpretation 106
In a system where the Constitution’s meaning can change based on state law and public
opinion, originalism and textualism lose their potency. Judges may still be guided by the
constitutional text; but in a document that is often “vague or irreducibly ambiguous,” the text can
only do so much. 107 Originalism’s utility fails even more in a consensus model: where the only
inquiry is change in opinion—rather than the original public meaning—originalism as a means of
constitutional interpretation becomes a nonstarter. The consensus approach, while beneficial for
other reasons, is undoubtedly at odds with two keys methods of American constitutional
interpretation and, for this reason, contributes to the fact that the Supreme Court is covert about
consensus.
But the principle of consensus can provide a more nuanced and concrete approach to the
living Constitution method of interpretation. 108 The living Constitution approach is “[b]ased on the

Keith E. Whittington, The New Originalism, 2 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 599, 599 (2004).
The Tenth Amendment provides: “The powers not delegated to the United States by Constitution, nor
prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.” US CONST. amend. X.
Some areas of law are explicitly limited to the federal government, and the states are “field pre-empted” from
passing any laws in this area. See, e.g., Gade v. Nat’l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass’n, 505 US 88, 98 (1992)
(“[N]onapproved state regulation of occupational safety and health issues for which a federal standard is in
effect is impliedly pre-empted”); Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 US 218 (1947) (“It is clear that since
warehouses engaged in the storage of grain for interstate or foreign commerce are in the federal domain,
Congress may, if it chooses, take unto itself all regulatory control over them”). In all of the cases presented in
this Article there are no issues of pre-emption.
107 Lawrence B. Solum, Originalism and Constitutional Construction, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 453, 467–68 (2013).
108 This is akin to the “living instrument” approach that the ECHR employs in interpreting the European
Convention. See generally George Letsas, The ECHR as a Living Instrument: Its Meaning and Legitimacy, in THE
EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN A NATIONAL, EUROPEAN AND GLOBAL CONTEXT (Geir
Ulfstein, Andreas Follesdal & Birgit Schlütter eds., 2010). While this may pose different problems in the
context of an international treaty—including the fact that progressive interpretation could be viewed as
imposing new requirements on signatories in a system premised on sovereignty and consent—the different
105
106
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idea that society changes and evolves” and “requires that constitutional controversies, in the words
of Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr., ‘must be considered in light of our whole experience and not
merely in that of what was said a hundred years ago.’” 109 The living Constitution approach may be
appropriate because “the world has changed in incalculable ways” and “it is just not realistic to
expect the cumbersome amendment process to keep up with these changes.” 110 Accordingly, by
applying this approach, the Court modernizes the law to keep up with the changing times. 111
The consensus-living Constitution approach provides a constrained and more foreseeable
way for judges to interpret the Constitution. By referring explicitly to state laws—perhaps as a proxy
for public opinion—courts can ground a changing constitutional jurisprudence in considerations less
nebulous than the “changing times.” Through a more systematized living Constitution approach,
those with fears of the judiciary becoming a supra-legislature can rest assured that the courts’
decisions will be in line with that of the public. Of course, this raises the question of whether it
should be the courts effectuating the public’s preferences or the legislature, and whether such an
approach would exacerbate the counter-majoritarian difficulty. 112 But this separation of powers issue

approach to interpretation is an important underlying difference between the European and American
systems, as the ECHR rarely employs a textualist or originalist method of interpretation.
109 Adam Winkler, A Revolution Too Soon: Woman Suffragists and the ‘Living Constitution’, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1456,
1463 (2001).
110 DAVID A. STRAUSS, THE LIVING CONSTITUTION 1–2 (2010).
111 Controversially, Judge Posner recently applied this approach to statutory interpretation in Hively v. Ivy Tech
Community College, 853 F.3d 339, 357 (7th Cir. 2017) (en banc) (Posner, J., concurring), stating that courts fairly
frequently impose new statutory interpretations on old statutes “that the Congress that enacted it would not
have accepted . . . to avoid statutory obsolescence and concomitantly to avoid placing the entire burden of
updating old statutes on the legislative branch.”
112 The countermajoritarian difficulty is the idea that “[j]udicial review conflicts with democracy because it
permits unelected judges to invalidate actions taken by representative branches of government.” Darren
Lenard Hutchinson, The Majoritarian Difficulty: Affirmative Action, Sodomy, and Supreme Court Politics, 23 LAW &
INEQ. 1, 1 (2005); See ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 16 (2d ed. 1986); Barry
Friedman, The History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part One; The Road to Judicial Supremacy, 73 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 333, 334 (1988) (“The ‘countermajoritarian difficulty’ has been the central obsessed of modern
constitutional scholarship.”).
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is beyond the scope of this Article, and it has been heavily discussed by numerous scholars
throughout the years. 113
C.

Normative

While it is important to understand the reasons for which the Supreme Court is covert in its
use of consensus, it is also necessary to consider whether invocation of consensus is normatively
preferable in the American judicial system. First, one must note that there is an alternative way to
consider the consensus model in US constitutional law: consensus does not bind the Court, but
rather provides the Court with constitutional authority to make a given decision. 114 Indeed, in the
context of the Eighth Amendment, the Court has proclaimed that “[t]he clearest and most reliable
objective evidence of contemporary values is the legislation enacted by the country’s legislatures.” 115
But simply because there is evidence of contemporary values does not mean that the Supreme Court
must heed those values; rather, it gives them the leeway to do so, consistent with state action.
Were the Supreme Court bound to explicitly base its decisions exclusively on the laws of the
states, its decisions that lack an explicit textual basis could be seen as more legitimate, as there would
be no concern the constitutional protections are “judge-made constitutional law.” 116 Further,
coordinate branches interpret the Constitution all the time, so deferring to their interpretation—as
well as that of the states—is not so outlandish. 117 Regardless of whether consensus constrains or
See, e.g., Dennis B. Wilson, Electing Federal Judges and Justices: Should the Supra-Legislators Be Accountable to the
Voters, 39 CREIGHTON L. REV. 695 (2006); Randy E. Barnett, The Disdain Campaign, 126 HARV. L. REV. F. 1
(2012); Edwin Meese III, Toward a Jurisprudence of Original Intent, 111 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 5, 7 (1998).
114 See, e.g., Richard Primus, Public Consensus as Constitutional Authority, 78 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1207 (2010)
(“[I]f we understand public consensus to be one potential source of authority within a larger process of
constitutional decisionmaking, we may find a better way of understanding the relationship between
constitutionalism and democracy.”); Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Counting States, 32 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 17
(2009).
115 Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 US 302, 331 (1989); accord Atkins v. Virginia, 536 US 304, 314–16 (2002) (holding that
execution of the mentally ill has “become truly unusual” and, accordingly, it was “fair to say that a national
consensus has developed against it.”).
116 See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 US 186, 194 (1986).
117 The President has the duty to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.” US CONST. art. II, § 3. In
order to fulfill this constitutional responsibility, the President must interpret the Constitution. In so
113
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grants authority to the Court to make decisions, consensus appears to affect decision-making, and
this alone warrants a normative analysis of the benefits and drawbacks of consensus in the US.
One reason that Constitution changing merely because a majority of states change their laws
may be troubling is because this appears to be an amendment process that is inconsistent with the
process explicitly prescribed by the Constitution. Article V of the Constitution sets forth the process
for amendment: “The Congress, whenever two thirds of both houses shall deem it necessary, shall
propose amendments to this Constitution, . . . which . . . shall be valid to all intents and purposes, as
part of this Constitution, when ratified by the legislatures of three fourth of the several states.” 118
Given the requirement that both two-thirds of Congress and three-fourths of the states’ ratification
is necessary to amend the Constitution, it would be peculiar for changes in states’ laws to change the
Constitution. 119
interpreting “a President may [constitutionally] refuse to execute a law on the ground that it is
unconstitutional,” and various presidents have done so. See ROAUL BERGER, EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE: A
CONSTITUTIONAL MYTH 306 (1974). See Memorial of Captain Meigs, 9 Op. Att’y Gen. 462, 469 (1860)
(“Every law is to be carried out so far as it is consistent with the Constitution, and no further. The sound part
of it must be executed and the vicious portion of it suffered to drop.”). See also Letter from Eric H. Holder,
Jr., Att’y Gen., to John A. Boehner, Speaker, US House of Representatives (Feb. 23, 2011),
https://perma.cc/98Q6-DNXX (citing US CONST. amend. V); Michael Sant’Ambrogio, The Extra-Legislative
Veto, 102 GEO. L.J. 351 (2014); Joseph Landau, DOMA and Preisdential Discretion: Interpreting and Enforcing
Federal Law, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 619 (2012). For example, the Obama administration refused to enforce the
Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA), which defined marriage as “a legal union between one man and one
woman,” arguing that it violated the “equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment. 1 USC. § 7; 28
USC § 1783C. Additionally, the Executive has prosecutorial discretion and “the Take Clause has not
traditionally been read to mandate executive prosecution of all violators of all federal laws.” Brett M.
Kavanaugh, Our Anchor for 225 Years and Counting: The Enduring Significance of the Precise Text of the Constitution, 89
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1907, 1911 (2014) (citing United States v. Cox, 342 F.2d 167, 171 (5th Cir. 1965) (noting
that the President, through the Attorney General who acts as the “hand of the President,” retains “the free
exercise of the discretionary powers of the attorneys of the United States in their control over criminal
prosecution.”)). Similarly, state legislatures must and indeed do often interpret the federal Constitution.
When passing laws, legislatures have the ability and responsibility to pass laws that they, in good faith, believe
to be constitutional. In order to pass laws, they must interpret the Constitution, apply the Supreme Court’s
precedent, and consider whether the law at issue would be constitutional. See generally Matthew Berns, Trigger
Laws, 97 GEO. L.J. 1639, 1653 (2009)
118 US CONST. art. V.
119 These decisions do not technically amend the Constitution. But, particularly in decisions where the
Supreme Court overruled past precedent—à la Lawrence, Brown, or Roper—there is a reasonable argument that
the Court changed the Constitution. Many conceive of the Constitution as being a rigid, unchanging
document, which has a “correct” application to any situation. See Christopher R. Green, Originalism and the
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However, consensus may be beneficial as a means to implement the Condorcet Jury
Theorem. 120 The Jury Theorem posits that “under certain conditions, a widespread belief, accepted
by a number of independent actors, is highly likely to be correct.” 121 Professors Posner and Sunstein
applied this idea to the use of comparative law. 122 Posner and Sunstein argue that “if the majority of
states believe that X is true, there is reason to believe that X is in fact true.” 123 The same idea might
be applicable to the domestic US context, or to the European context. 124
If the US Supreme Court or the ECHR were able to effectively capitalize on the Jury
Theorem then, in theory, the Court would always come to the best decisions. 125 Additionally, were
this the case, then the Court’s decisions would never overrule the decisions of a majority of states
because, by definition, the Theorem only applies when the “majority of states believes that X is
true.” 126 Accordingly, the Court would face less legitimacy concerns under this approach.
While the application of the Jury Theorem is intriguing in the abstract, it faces serious
difficulties in practice—both in the American and European contexts. The main problem arises
insofar as there is no way to guarantee that decisions of the various states are truly independent—as
is required by the Theorem. As Posner and Sunstein explain, “If the foreign law exists because the
foreign state mimicked some other state, then the law would not count as an independent vote, as

Sense-Reference Distinction, 50 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 555, 556 (2006) (“Justice Scalia, joined by Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justice Thomas, set[ ] out a vision of an unchanging Constitution.”).
120 See CONDORCET: SELECTED WRITINGS (Keith Michael Baker ed., 1976).
121 See Eric A. Posner & Cass R. Sunstein, The Law of Other States, 59 STAN. L. REV. 131, 131 (2006).
122 See generally id.
123 Id. at 136.
124 See, e.g., Shai Dothan, The Optimal Use of Comparative Law, 43 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 21, 22 (2014)
125 This argument is akin to “marketplace of ideas” in the free speech context. See generally Stnaley Ingber, The
Marketplace of Ideas: A Legitimizing Myth, 1984 DUKE L.J. 1 (1984). But the marketplace of ideas argument in
the First Amendment context faces its critics, and many of those same problems apply here. See generally
Gregory Brazeal, How Much Does a Belief Cost?: Revisiting the Marketplace of Ideas, 21 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 1
(2011) (collecting arguments against the marketplace of ideas).
126 See Posner & Sunstein, supra note 121 at 136.
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required by the Jury Theorem. When this condition is violated, we say that foreign law reflects a
cascade effect.” 127
It is highly likely that state-to-state cascade occurs in the United States. Both the Democratic
and Republican Parties have strong national platforms and agendas which they push down to the
most local levels. Nearly every election in the United States is won by either a self-proclaimed
Democrat or Republican. The national government is formed by State representatives who put forth
their constituents’ preferences. Finally, states are bound by the decisions of the federal courts of
appeals that encapsulate their states, creating uniformity among states within the vicinity of one
another. For all of these reasons, the application of the Jury Theorem to the American federal
context, while seemingly good, is incredibly troubling.
Implementation of the Jury Theorem in the European context seems more possible, though
the likelihood of cascade remains high, 128 as there is still no way to know whether member states of
the Council of Europe actually arrived at their decision independently. Intuitively to an American
audience, it may feel like decisions are more likely to be independent in Europe than in the US
However, like the US, Europe has become increasingly federal. European states face significant
regulation from the European Union, 129 they are subject to the jurisdiction of two supra-national
courts (the ECHR and the European Court of Justice), 130 as well as many international agreements
that bind Europe as a whole. 131 And while Europe is not dominated by a two-party system like the

Posner & Sunstein, supra note 121 at 144–45.
Cf. Dothan, supra note 124, at 22 (“[The ECHR] aggregates the preferences of a wide range of states, each
of which has already made an independent decision,” the result allows for the “benefits of comparative law
. . . without the risk of information cascades.
129 See, e.g., Brexit is a golden chance to throw some EU regulations on a bonfire, TELEGRAPH (Mar. 27, 2017),
https://perma.cc/X897-PZKT.
130 See generally Laurence R. Helfer & Anne-Marie Slaughter, Toward a Theory of Effective Supranational
Adjudication, 107 YALE L.J. 273 (1997).
131 For example, in climate change negotiations, the European Union negotiates as a block rather than having
individual states represent themselves. See generally Beatriz Pérez de las Heras, The European Union, The United
States, and China Dialogue on Climate Change: Respective Policies and Mutual Synergies for a World Climate Order, 26
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US, there is significant communication among states. Accordingly, as in the US, the Jury Theorem
may not hold in the European context, despite it seeming to be a more fruitful location for its
benefits to take hold.
There are undoubtedly benefits and drawbacks to the use of consensus in the American
context. Given that the Supreme Court rarely admits that it uses consensus, though, it is hard to
imagine how one could go about curbing invocation of the doctrine. Instead, it is fruitful for
scholars to think about effective ways to capitalize on the use of consensus when bringing claims to
argue for new constitutional protections that previously had not been recognized.
III.

CONCLUSION
While scholars have previously pointed out the US Supreme Court’s apparent consensus

approach to constitutional jurisprudence, the link between the Supreme Court’s approach and that
of the European Court of Human Rights is novel and consequential. Even more important is
understanding why the Supreme Court is covert about its implementation of consensus, whereas
consensus is a key doctrine in European Jurisprudence. It appears that the two courts’ differing
legitimacy concerns and approaches to interpretation undergird the courts’ openness in exploring
their respective doctrines of consensus.
There is another key difference between the US and European approaches: the ECHR
functions on a consensus model, while the US Supreme Court functions as a quasi-anti consensus
model. That is to say: the US Supreme Court only imposes rules on outliers, whereas the ECHR
self-consciously proclaims that states have latitude to make decisions up to and until there is a
consensus, at which time the ECHR suppresses the outliers. Perhaps this distinction is only

GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 13 (2013). Similarly, the EU shares a currency—the Euro—which prevents
individual countries from affecting their money supply and grants the power of regulating monetary policy to
the European Central Bank. See Nahalel A. Nellis, Deficiencies in European Monetary Union’s Credible Commitment
Against Monetary Expansion, 33 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 263 (2000).
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rhetorical; nevertheless, the two courts’ conception of themselves is important in understanding the
American and European approaches to consensus.
This connection underscores a broader point about courts in federal systems: legitimacy
concerns force courts to remain within the “mainstream.” 132 As policymakers and leaders in
international organizations think about the creation of new international courts, they should
consider the legitimacy concerns that courts in federal systems face in developing the protocols for
these courts. Perhaps in some contexts, as with the ECHR, it makes more sense for the court to be
explicit about its invocation of consensus. Or, in other contexts, it might make more sense for the
court to be more opaque about its use of consensus in order to preserve legitimacy. The bottom line
is this: courts in federal systems have legitimacy concerns, and the people who create courts need to
be cognizant of how the court should balance the concerns of legitimacy and independence to create
an effective court.

The “mainstream,” in this context was measured using state laws and public opinion surveys. There are a
number of ways one could go about the mainstream. Additionally, this paper in no way asserts whether state
laws or public opinion polls are more indicative of the “mainstream” that either the US Supreme Court of the
European Court of Human Rights is more likely to follow. As explained above, both the US Supreme Court
and the European Court of Human Rights explicitly count state laws in many opinions; but neither explicitly
looks to public opinion polls. Nonetheless, it would be foolish to think that judges were not aware of public
opinion.
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